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ABSTRACT :  Starting with Vaihinger’s famous trilemma which presents the different possibilities for 
explaining the origin of affection, I critically assess the classical theses of Jacobi, Aenesidemus-Schulze, 
Adickes, Kemp Smith, Paton and Allison on this subject. I argue that Kant is entitled to claim that both the 
empirical object and the thing in itself are the source of affection.  It depends on the point of view one 
adopts: empirical or transcendental.  But in this last case we face the famous problem: How could Kant dare 
to depict the thing in itself as the “cause” of affection? I claim that his description complies mutatis mutandis 
with the conditions imposed upon the principle of causality. If this principle states that the cause and the 
effect are “heterogeneous” and that the necessary cause may be a mere “indeterminate” something, then the 
affecting thing in itself, at its own level, satisfies both conditions:  The thing in itself and sensation are 
radically heterogeneous and the essence of this thing remains for Kant totally “problematic”, although its 
existence is declared certain. The Kantian use of the concept of causality is justified here by what must be 
called the self-referentiality of transcendental philosophy.   
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*  *  * 
 
1 - Vaihinger's trilemma 
 
 Summing up a discussion that had been going on for over a century, Hans Vaihinger in 
the second volume of his famous Commentar (1892) came to the conclusion that there are three -
- equally unsatisfactory -- ways of explaining the source of affection in Kant's philosophy: 
 
  1-Either one means by the [affecting object] the thing in itself;... 
  2-Or we mean by the affecting object the objects in space;... 
  3-Or we admit a double affection: a transcendent one through the things in   themselves, 
and an empirical one through the objects in space,...1 
																																																																				
1 Hans Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kants "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", vol. 2 (Stuttgart/Berlin/Leipzig: 
Union deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1892), 53. 
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The last alternative is especially designed to obviate the difficulties inherent to the first two.  But 
Erich Adickes, who was to become its main advocate, had to admit that the theory of double 
affection involves a serious problem, namely the fact that it does not find evidence in Kant's text 
itself.2  We will therefore leave it aside and concentrate on the first two.  However, part 1 and 2 
of the trilemma also seem to lead to apparently insurmountable problems.  In fact, Vaihinger 
claims that each of them contains an inner contradiction in that they blatantly go against Kant's 
own teachings. 
 Take the first case, the thing in itself is said to be at the origin of the affection of the 
knowing subject:  Kant cannot help but describe this influence of the thing in itself over 
sensibility in terms of causality.  Now, as Aenesidemus-Schulze quickly discovered, the category 
of "cause" (Ursache) can be legitimately used only in the field of experience, so that its 
application to the thing in itself is clearly in contradiction with the results of the Transcendental 
Analytic, and in particular with the principle of the Second Analogy of Experience.3 
 Similar difficulties arise in the second branch of the trilemma, which stipulates that it is 
appearance in space that engenders the affection.  If, according to Kant's own definition, an 
appearance is no more than a mere representation in us, how could this same appearance affect 
sensibility from without and produce a representation in consciousness?  Is it not Kant who 
taught that appearances are the product of affection?  This reminds us of the famous objection 
raised by Jacobi.4   
 Instead of focusing our attention on the search for a third way in order to escape from the 
alleged contradictions, it might be useful to pay closer attention to the first two explanations, if 
only because both find textual evidence in Kant.  In other words, rather than trying to correct the 
letter of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by what one considers to be its spirit, why not see if it is 
possible to reconcile the spirit with the letter?  Furthermore, why not try to harmonize these two 
solutions of the problem of affection, as they are expounded in the Critique.  There is no reason 
to believe that the letter of the text should not be taken seriously, especially in cases in which, 
like the first explanation, Kant repeatedly uses the words "cause" (Ursache) and "ground" 
																																																																				
2  Erich Adickes, Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion unseres ich als Schlüssel zu seiner 
Erkenntnistheorie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1929). 
3 Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Professor Reinhold in Jena 
gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie (1792; reprint, Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1911), 199. 
4 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, "Ueber den transzendentalen Idealismus", Appendix to David Hume über den 
Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus.  Ein Gespräch, in Werke, ed. Friedrich Roth and Friedrich 
Köppen, vol. 2 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 291-310.  
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(Grund) to describe the action of the thing in itself on human sensibility.5  Is it possible to 
conceive that by making a transcendental usage of the category of causality, he would willingly 
contradict his own critical philosophy in such an obvious fashion?  Rather, there must be a sense 
in which Kant feels justified in his recourse to these terms.  So there is no compelling reason to 
dismiss this terminology by attributing it to an "occasional looseness of formulation" on Kant's 
part, nor to the fact that Kant's "mode of expressing his doctrine of affection is misleading".6   
 Henry Allison, in his defense of Kant's transcendental idealism, attempts to solve the 
problems raised by the first branch of the trilemma in a manner which raises many questions. 
 
  Admittedly, there are many passages in which Kant refers mysteriously to a 
"transcendental ground" or "cause" of appearances.  As I have argued elsewhere, 
however, this is not to be taken as an appeal to non-empirical explanation of what 
appears, but rather as a device for rejecting as vacuous any such explanation.7 
 
In fact, Allison attempts to dispel the "mystery" surrounding the concept of a transcendental 
ground or cause by eliminating what he describes as any kind of "metaphysical" explanation in 
his Kant's Transcendental Idealism.  In other words, he refuses to provide a solution to the 
problem of the thing in itself (as the cause of the affection of the knowing subject) by appealing 
to any form of knowledge.  He stresses the Kantian distinction between knowing (Erkennen ) and 
thinking (Denken) in order to argue that the category of "cause" (acting here as a transcendental 
ground) is allowable only if understood in a strictly "logical" sense, suggesting a relation to a 
																																																																				
5 See for "Ursache", Kritik der reinen Vernunft (hereafter, the passages quoted in English will be taken 
from Norman Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique of Pure Reason), A 288/B 344, A 372, A 387, A 
391, A 393, A 394, A 494/B 521;  and for "Grund", ibid, A 49/B 66, A 277/B 333, A 380, A 393, A 
538/B 566, A 613/B 641.  For the purposes of this paper, we need not distinguish more precisely the thing 
in itself from the transcendental object.  The passages quoted above refer indifferently to Ding an sich, 
Sache an sich,  Gegenstand an sich, Objekt an sich, as well as to transzendentaler Gegenstand and 
transzendentales Objekt. I do not agree with Rescher's claim according to which Kant uses "cause" here 
in the sense of "ground" as this word is employed to designate the "merely intelligible and... regulative 
Principle of Sufficient Reason". I shall come back to this interpretation later.  See Nicholas Rescher, 
"Noumenal Causality," in Kant's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Lewis White Beck (Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel, 
1974), 176.  In this Rescher was followed by John Visintainer, "Kant's Problem of Causality and the 
Ding-an-sich," Auslegung 21 (1997): 19-33. 
6 Rescher, "Noumenal Causality," 178.  Gerd Buchdahl, "Realism and Realization in a Kantian Light," in 
Reading Kant.  New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy, ed. Eva Schaper 
and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 240, see also 244. 
7 Henry Allison, "Transcendental Idealism: The 'Two Aspect ' View", in New Essays on Kant, ed. Bernard 
den Ouden et al. (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 168, emphasis mine.  See also his Kant's Transcendental 
Idealism: An Interpretation and a Defense (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983), 250-
254. 
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transcendental object that can only be "thought" of, but not known.  For my part, I would like to 
argue that the reference to a mere concept, even to the "necessity" of that concept, is not 
sufficient to characterize Kant's argumentation here.8  In my view, Kant's critical discourse 
involves a specific form of knowledge and a legitimate claim to truth.  In what follows, it will 
remain to be seen what restrictions a transcendental discourse, such as the one we find in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, is subject to when it refers to non-empirical elements of explanation.  
The question is: under what conditions can the thing in itself, taken as the cause of affection, be 
admitted as part of an explanation of the conditions of human knowledge?  Thus, there must be 
elements within the first Critique able to shed light on the problematic of affection which lead to 
a coherent account of the respective role of things in themselves and appearances in this regard. 
 Instead of starting by classifying and discussing all the cases in the Critique where 
affection is explained in terms of appearances or in terms of things in themselves, it might be 
better to concentrate on a singular case, in which both forms of explanation seem to compete 
with one another.  I shall start, therefore, with the study of the Anticipations of Perception in 
order to show that sensation can be construed in terms of an affection stemming from the object 
of perception, as well as from the thing in itself.  This twofold explanation, that at first sight 
might appear confusing, if not plainly self-contradicting, is acceptable only if the transcendental 
level of discourse is carefully distinguished from the empirical.  No doubt transcendental 
discourse involves some privileges, such as referring to the thing in itself as a transcendental 
object, still more important, however, is the fact that such a discourse is subject to certain 
restrictions that can only be assigned by critical reason itself, which are, in fact, present in Kant's 
transcendental philosophy.  It will be our task to bring them to light.  Otherwise, if the 
transcendental level of discourse was simply an invitation to transcend every limitation and 
reinstate dogmatic metaphysics, Strawson would be correct in claiming that the explanation of 
affection in terms of the thing in itself can only introduce "perversions" in a philosophy that first 
aimed at setting strict limits on human knowledge.  It remains to be seen in what sense Kant does 
not contravene his own "principle of significance", according to which the bounds of sense 
coincide with the limits of experience.9 
 If, following this line of thought, a plausible answer can be found to the difficult question 
of transcendental causality (i.e. part one of Vaihinger's trilemma) or, in other words, if the 
transcendental use of the category of cause in this special case can prove legitimate, then it might 
open the possibility of providing an acceptable reading of the second branch of the trilemma, 
																																																																				
8 Henry Allison, "Transcendental Idealism: The 'Two Aspect' View", 173. 
9 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense.  An Essay on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (London: 
Methuen, 1966), 249, 254, 256. 
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according to which appearance can also be seen to be the source of affection.  What I propose 
can be considered as a reconstruction of the problematic of affection, drawing upon elements 
scattered throughout the Critique of Pure Reason.  More specifically, I want to argue that the 
concept of cause used by Kant to designate the thing in itself belongs to a dynamical principle 
and that for this reason it has special privileges as becomes clear in the critical explanation of the 
Antinomies of pure reason.  For instance, the concept of cause can refer to something that is 
totally different ("heterogeneous") from its effect so that sensation might as well be attributed -- 
from a critical point of view -- to something that transcends the limits of experience. 
 
2 - realitas phaenomenon/realitas noumenon 
 
 Although the problem of affection is introduced right at the beginning of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, it is not in this section of the Critique that we learn about the question 
at hand: the question concerning the source of affection.  In most cases, Kant does not determine 
what the cause of affection is with any precision.  He attributes it to the object in general 
(Gegenstand, Objekt) or to the soul (Gemüth).  In an exceptional passage the appearance 
resulting from the "affection" is related with the thing in itself (B 61).  But as for the other 
occurrences of the word "affection", the reader has little choice but to guess what this affecting 
"object" might be.   
 One way of grasping this question is by considering a theme that is closely related to the 
problem of affection: sensation.  On the first page of the Transcendental Aesthetic, sensation is 
described as the result of affection exerted upon the knowing subject.  Sensation is defined as the 
empirical effect of the affecting object.  "The effect of an object upon the faculty of 
representation, so far as we are affected by it, is sensation." (A 19-20/B 34, Kant's emphasis)  
Beyond the fact that this object is the cause of sensation, we do not learn anything more definite 
about it.  If we turn to the section of the Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant deals extensively 
with the theme of sensation, we face a very different situation. 
 Let us first consider the formulation of the principle of the Anticipations of Perception.  
As we know, the central category of the principle is "reality" and the wording of this principle, in 
the first edition, gives an indication as to the nature of the reality in question.   
 
  In all appearances sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in the object (realitas 
phaenomenon) has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree. (A 166, Kant's emphasis)  
  
The reality that corresponds to sensation mentioned above is phenomenal, it belongs to the object 
of perception.  As Kant writes a few pages later: "what corresponds in empirical intuition to 
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sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon)" (A 168/B 209).  It is important to closely scrutinize 
these definitions, because in turning to the formulation of the problem of reality in the chapter on 
Schematism, we discover a wholly different picture. 
 
  Since time is merely the form of intuition, and so of object as appearances, that in the 
objects which corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as 
things in themselves (thinghood [Sachheit], reality). (A 143/B 182, emended trans.) 
 
The question is posed in roughly the same terms as the formulation of the principle introduced 
above, but the answer is astonishing.  No longer is it the phenomenal reality that "corresponds" 
to sensation, but rather the "transcendental matter" of the "things in themselves".  This answer is 
quite puzzling, especially if we compare it with the line adopted in the Anticipations of 
Perception, in which reality is constantly referred to as empirical.  One could be tempted to 
attribute it to a slip of the tongue on Kant's part, were it not for this passage of the Schematism 
being echoed in many others in the first Critique that deal with the thing in itself as the cause of 
appearances.  Is there a way of making sense of these conflicting views concerning the source of 
affection?  It looks as though one has to choose between realitas phaenomenon and realitas 
noumenon.  The importance of this problem has not been lost on Kant's commentators. 
 Norman Kemp Smith finds the paragraph devoted to the category of reality in the chapter 
on Schematism "extremely difficult to decipher", and for this reason he prefers the developments 
of the Anticipations of Perception, which are "more precise and less ambiguous".10  This means 
that he is fully aware of the difficulties implicit in the reference to the thing in itself included in 
the description of the schema of reality.  In any event, Kemp Smith was to settle the matter in his 
1927 translation of the Critique of Pure Reason by making his an emendation of the text already 
proposed by Wille.  Following the advice of Wille, he included a negation in the sentence quoted 
above, so that the passage on the schema of reality now reads: "...that in the objects which 
corresponds to sensation is not the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves..." 
(A 143/B 182, trans., 184)  H. J. Paton, for his part, does not find the correction introduced by 
Wille "convincing".  Like Kemp Smith, he attempts to consider the full scope of the difficulty 
presented by the definition of the chapter on Schematism.  He is thus led to envisage the 
possibility that reality is seen from two different perspectives: "the matter of the phenomenal 
object" and the "matter of things in themselves".11  He is not ready, however, to sacrifice the 
																																																																				
10 Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1950), 350-351. 
11 H. J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience.  A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 50-51, note 1.  Nine years after the publication of the 
Critique, Kant, in his article against Eberhard, was to come back to the problem of sensation in terms very 
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latter, as some are tempted to do, by interpreting the expression "things in themselves" in its 
"physical sense".  For Paton, the fact that the "matter" in question is characterized by Kant as 
"transcendental" rules out such an interpretation.12 
 The reference to those two prominent Kant scholars shows clearly how subtle the 
explanation of sensation is and how strong, in the case of Kamp Smith, the tendency to eliminate 
the causality of the thing in itself is.  We have seen that according to the introductory sections of 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, sensation is an "effect" that finds its source in an object that 
remains to be specified.  But the principle of the Anticipations of Perception explicitly states that 
the object in question has a phenomenal reality.  This suggests that it is the empirical object of 
perception that exerts "a degree of influence on the senses" (B 208).  Although the treatment of 
the category of cause in fact belongs to the Second Analogy of Experience, in the Anticipations 
of Perception Kant already makes use of the principle of causality in order to explain the role of 
empirical reality in the genesis of sensation: 
 
  If this reality is viewed as cause [Ursache], either of sensation or of some other reality 
in the [field of] appearance, such as change, the degree of the reality as cause  is then 
entitled a moment, for example the moment of gravity.13 
 
But if the Anticipations establish that the empirical object must be seen as the "cause" of 
sensation, we should remember that this reading is not the only possibility for the Critique.  
Besides the schema of reality already alluded to, there are many passages in the fourth 
Paralogism (the first edition), where the thing in itself is declared as the "cause" of appearances.  
Even the text of the Second Analogy, while dealing with the empirical usage of the category of 
causality, unmistakably stipulates that the thing in itself is the source of affection.14  This does 
not solve our problem, but simply shows that both lines of reasoning are present in the Critique 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
similar to the ones used here: instead of the word "matter", he uses the word "stuff": "the objects as things 
in themselves give the stuff [Stoff] to the empirical intuitions..." Kant, Über eine Entdeckung nach der 
alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll, AK VIII, 215. 
12 Béatrice Longuenesse suggests reading the expression "thing in itself" here in its weaker sense, that is, 
as the "empirical" thing in itself.  According to her, this interpretation does not exclude the presence -- in 
the background -- of the thing in itself in its stronger meaning.  See her Kant et le pouvoir de juger.  
Sensibilité et discursivité dans l'Analytique transcendantale de la Critique de la raison pure (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1993), 344. 
13 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 168/B 210, emended trans., emphasis added; see the corresponding 
passage in the Second Analogy of Experience, A 208/B 254. 
14 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 190/B 235.  For the other passages in which the thing in itself is declared 
to be at the origin of appearances, see note 6 above. 
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of Pure Reason and that Kant seems ready to live with them both.  In fact, he sustains both of 
them simultaneously.  If we do not wish to adopt Vaihinger's somewhat rash judgment, that 
maintaining the two already self-contradicting theories of affection inevitably leads to further 
contradictions, we must be ready to investigate the conditions under which both explanations can 
appear equally acceptable to Kant. 
 
3 - Empirical and Transcendental Discourses 
 
 The affection that manifests itself in sensation can be attributed, as we have just seen, to 
appearance as well as to the thing in itself.  But from the standpoint of experience there is, 
truthfully, no need to distinguish between appearances and things in themselves.  We might well 
distinguish between the raindrops, as the "physical" thing in itself, and the rainbow, as their 
appearance (A 45/B 62-62), but this distinction would remain on an empirical level and it is not 
relevant to the problematic of affection in the Critique of Pure Reason.  The differentiation of the 
two affecting objects pertains to transcendental philosophy as such. 
 
  The transcendental concept of appearances in space… is a critical reminder that nothing 
intuited in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in 
themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are quite unknown to us, 
and that what we call outer objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility 
the form of which is space.  The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not 
known, and cannot be known, through these representations; and in experience no 
question is ever asked in regard to it. (A 30/B 45) 
 
From the point of view of experience, it is no use to know that every object we encounter is an 
appearance.  On the contrary, from this empirical perspective, we are convinced that the things 
with which we deal in our everyday life are the real things, the things in themselves. 
 
  In all problems which may arise in the field of experience we treat these appearances as 
objects in themselves, without troubling ourselves about the primary ground of their 
possibility (as appearances).15 
 
The question concerning the ground of the possibility of appearances is clearly not an empirical 
one, it pertains exclusively to transcendental philosophy.  If the concept of appearance in its 
transcendental sense is introduced as a "critical reminder", this simply suggests that the question 
concerning the ground of these appearances is specific to the enterprise of Kant's Critique of 
																																																																				
15 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 393.  See also Kant, Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, 
AK. XX, 269. 
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Pure Reason. 
 But now, the point that must be clarified concerns the meaning of the word 
"transcendental" itself.  It is well known that Kant sometimes uses the word as a synonym of 
"transcendent", however, when he actually defines it, he refers to the special status of the 
investigation taking place in the Critique.  Critical investigation differs from all other kinds of 
knowledge in that it is not oriented directly towards the object.  Transcendental philosophy is not 
concerned with the immediate knowledge of an object, and in this way it diverges from all other 
science, even metaphysics, which seeks to outline the very essence of its objects without any 
further precaution.  Kant tends to view metaphysics as "dogmatic", in that the word itself 
describes the process of an investigation that has not previously submitted its cognitive tools to a 
critique.  Critical investigation is anti-dogmatic per defenitionem because it does not start by 
taking for granted the accessibility of its object. 
 
  I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as 
with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be 
possible a priori.16 
 
This definition of "transcendental" taken from the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason 
is explicit: the word delineates the status of an investigation focused on the "mode of our 
knowledge", rather than the object to be known.  In short, a transcendental discourse concerns 
the "knowledge... of our knowledge".  Hence, it initiates a special kind of reflection about 
knowledge.  This reflection is specific in that the knowledge under scrutiny is our a priori 
knowledge.  More precisely, transcendental investigation is geared toward answering our 
question about "synthetic" a priori knowledge (B 40).  In this sense, "transcendental" is 
emblematic of the main question in Kant's theoretical philosophy: "How are a priori synthetic 
propositions possible?" 
 This question is another way of acknowledging the challenge posed by Hume's 
scepticism concerning the universality and necessity of the law of causality. According to Kant, 
Hume raised a transcendental question, but did not have the conceptual means to answer it.  
Transcendental discourse, it follows, is an attempt to provide an answer to Hume's question.  
Compared with the discourse of experience, this discourse is situated on a higher level.  As 
Maclachlan suggests, these two levels can be compared, in Tarskian terms, with the relation 
between a meta-language and its object-language.17  There are issues that can be dealt with in a 
																																																																				
16 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 25, Kant's emphasis; see also Prolegomena, AK IV, 293, 374. 
17 D. L. C. Maclachlan, "The Things in Themselves Appear in a Meta-Language," in the Proceedings of 
the Eighth International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, vol. 2, part 1 (Milwaukee: Marquette 
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meta-language that could not possibly be formulated from the standpoint of an object-language.  
In this sense, transcendental critique is a meta-knowledge, designed especially to explain the 
possibility of first level knowledge: experience.  This is precisely the manner in which the 
distinction between appearance and thing in itself operates.  But such a critique, we must keep in 
mind, also represents a form of knowledge.  This fact is taken for granted in the definition quoted 
above: "I entitle transcendental all knowledge..."  The Prolegomena introduce transcendental 
philosophy as a "new science", as a science that offers, like every other science, a claim to 
"truth".18  In this case, the certainty claimed is not a merely relative or hypothetical one, it is 
"apodeictic (philosophical) certainty" (A XV). 
   The outcome of such an investigation is that knowledge involves formal as well as 
material conditions.  As we know, the formal conditions are all a priori, they are imposed by the 
knowing subject upon the object; whereas the material conditions are always a posteriori.  When 
confronted with the material conditions, the subject recognizes that, contrary to what happens 
with the formal conditions (viz. space, time, and the categories), it does not itself generate the 
manifold of the object of experience.  This manifold must be given empirically through 
sensation.  But since sensation can only take place within the framework of space and time, in 
other words, since the form as well as the matter of sensation can only be representations in the 
subject, this very sensation must be related to something real outside the scope of appearances: 
the thing in itself.  That is, the conclusion arrived at here is strictly the product of a self-
examination of the faculty of knowledge and of the elementary components of the object of 
experience.  It is only because the knowing subject measures through the critical process the 
limits of its active intervention in the genesis of experience, that it cannot help but admit that the 
spatio-temporal framework imposed upon the object of perception entails, as a counterpart, the 
existence of an unknown something beyond the phenomenal world.19  In order to explain the 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
University Press, 1995), 156. 
18 Prolegomena, AK IV, 279, 317. 
19 See Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AK IV, 451.  In his book Der philosophische 
Kritizismus, Alois Riehl has rightly noticed that the affirmation of the reality of the thing in itself stems 
from a critical argument: "The result of our account of the methodological concepts of appearance and of 
its correlate, the thing in itself, is that Kant taught without the slightest hesitation the existence of the 
things, not simply because he found no reason to sublate it [i.e. the thing in itself, C.P.], but because at the 
outset of the investigation of a priori knowledge and of its constitution the existence of the things came 
out to be grounded."  Alois Riehl, Der philosophische Kritizismus.  Geschichte und System, vol. 1, 
Geschichte des philosophischen Kritizismus, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Kröner, 1924), 563.  This is an important 
point to make, without it one could be tempted, like Adickes, to attribute Kant's assumptions concerning 
the thing in itself not to a transcendental motive, but to a psychological one.  Adickes sees Kant's realism 
as an existential component of his personality, and not as a philosophical necessity related to the critical 
investigation.  He very often refers to Kant's "stark realistisch gefärbten Art seines Erlebens", which is 
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necessity of sensation as the material condition of the appearances in the subject's consciousness, 
Kant is compelled to assert the actuality of a transcendent cause of these material conditions, and 
for this he has at his disposal only the tools that are provided a priori by the understanding: the 
category of cause (and of existence).  Because he applies it to the thing in itself as a transcendent 
entity, he clearly makes "transcendental use" of it, bringing us back to the heart of the difficulty 
encountered in the first branch of Vaihinger's trilemma.20 
 
4 - The Various Kinds of Transcendental Use of the Categories  
 
 Kant stresses constantly in the first Critique the fact that no transcendental employment 
of the categories can be allowed.  These categories, so the Analytic teaches us, are only valid 
within the realm of experience.  We must ask the question: why would Kant allow himself to 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
strictly in accordance with his scepticism of Kant's capacity to provide "scientifically (i.e. transcendental-
philosophical) grounded assertions" about the existence or the non-existence of the thing in itself.  See 
Erich Adickes, Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion unseres ich, 2, 36, 45;  see also  his book, Kant 
und das Ding an sich (Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, 1924), 16, 60, 93.  George Schrader also lays stress 
on Kant's realism as a "private view":  "The Thing in Itself in Kant's Philosophy", in Kant.  A Collection 
of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 174, 177.  For my part, I would 
like to take the opposite stand, and argue that the affirmation of the existence of the thing in itself is 
necessarily implied by the account Kant intends to give of the possibility of experience as a whole. 
20 In order to circumvent the problem posed by this transcendental use of the categories of causality and 
of existence, a very tempting alternative consists in interpreting the relation between appearance and thing 
in itself with the help of the chapter devoted to the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena.  
Because we must think the thing in itself as being the correlate of the appearances, why not conceive the 
thing in itself as a pure object of thought, as an ens rationis, as a Verstandeswesen, in a word, as a 
Noumenon.  Moltke S. Gram, however, has convincingly shown that there is a strict difference between 
the thing in itself and the Noumenon.  In fact, the thing in itself can appear in sensibility, it is the correlate 
of the appearance, whereas the Noumenon "does not affect our modes of intuition".  See his The 
Transcendental Turn: The Foundation of Kant's Idealism (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984), 
46.  This only emphasizes the important difference between the problematic of the thing in itself raised in 
Transcendental Aesthetic, and the problematic of the chapter on Phenomenon and Noumenon.  In the first 
case, the thing in itself plays the role of an indispensable correlate of the appearance, in the second case, 
the Noumenon is introduced as a limiting concept designed "to curb the pretensions of sensibility", that is, 
of empiricism (See Critique of Pure Reason, A 255/B 311).  Admittedly, both problematics, at times, 
overlap in the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena, but that is not a sufficient reason to interpret the 
correlate of appearances as "thought-things" (Nicholas Rescher, "On the Status of 'Things in Themselves' 
in Kant", Synthese 47 (1981): 299), as a mere "postulate" (Rescher, "Noumenal Causality," 181), or as a 
"limiting concept" (Schrader, "The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy," 181, note 1).  It is hard to 
believe that Kant would have considered the thing in itself as something we might only "think" of (Hoke 
Robinson, "Two Perspectives on Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves," Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 32 (1994): 431, 435, 441), so that he would have attributed to it only a "thought existence" 
(Horst Seidl, "Bemerkungen zu Ding an sich und transzendentalem Gegenstand in Kants Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft," Kant-Studien 63 (1972): 307).    
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make a transcendental use of causality in contemplating the thing in itself as the correlate of 
appearances?  This employment is no doubt transcendental since the category is applied to a 
thing that lies outside the realm of experience, outside of space and time.  Why would Kant 
tolerate such an exception?  First of all, it must be acknowledged that this transcendental 
employment enjoys a unique status, thus it cannot be identified with the main kinds of 
transcendental use the Critique condemns.  The first of these proscribed uses is to be found in the 
appendix to the Analytic: the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection.  Within, Kant criticizes 
philosophy that does not take seriously the ontological difference between sensible and 
intellectual representations. In the absence of this previous examination of the nature of our 
representations, Leibniz proposed an "intellectual system of the world" in which he 
"intellectualised appearances".  Leibniz used the concepts of the understanding 
"transcendentally" because the specificity of the objects accessible to our knowledge was not 
taken into account (A 270-1/B 326-7, A 289/B 345). The same cannot be said of the use of the 
category of cause in question, because Kant's employment is made precisely from a critical point 
of view, in order to explain the very nature of the objects available to us through sensibility.  
This use is thus not based on an amphiboly; on the contrary, it is especially aimed at elucidating 
the confusion. 
 The same goes for the transcendental use of the categories that is made in the 
Transcendental Dialectic.21  This use does not depend on a mere error of judgment, it is instead 
forced by reason's own principles, which are from the start declared "transcendent".  As a distinct 
faculty, reason turns toward the "absolute", that is, the "unconditioned" that closes all chains of 
conditions in experience (A 326/B 382, A 307-8/B 364).  With the help of a series of truncated 
syllogisms, the three ideas of pure reason enjoin the subject to gain knowledge of the 
unconditioned itself.  For example, in the third Antinomy, dogmatic metaphysics attempts to pass 
judgment on a free cause and in the fourth on the bearer of the ultimate condition of all things in 
the world: an absolutely necessary being.  Kant's critical solution in these cases consists in 
stating that through our categories, we cannot know anything about the unconditioned, that we 
cannot even understand how a spontaneous cause would act, no more than we can attach any 
meaning to the modal concept of "absolute necessity".  The three transcendental ideas of reason 
represent the ambitions of dogmatic metaphysics, and Kant shows that no knowledge can be 
expected from this field.  The rational principles involved do not provide any objective 
knowledge, they serve merely as regulative principles.   
 All things considered, the way in which the problem of the thing in itself as the correlate 
																																																																				
21 In this context, Kant speaks more specifically of a "transcendent use" of the understanding.  See 
Prolegomena §45, AK. IV, 333. 
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of the appearances is formulated bears no resemblance to the transcendental use of the categories 
made in the ideas of pure reason.  Kant does not claim that the correlate of the appearances is 
unconditioned nor do we know if it is conditioned or not; we do not need to know: "when I view 
all things not as phenomena but as things in themselves, and as objects of the mere 
understanding, then despite their being substances they can be regarded, in respect to their 
existence, as depending upon a foreign cause."22  Dogmatic metaphysicians wanted to establish a 
science of transcendent objects (the soul, the world, God), while transcendental philosophy, in 
explaining the scope of possible knowledge, just has to point to an unknown cause of 
appearances.  The critical philosopher does not have to know more in order to explain the 
possibility of experience.  In this sense, the thing in itself does not claim a status different from 
that of transcendental apperception -- the ultimate condition of the application of every category.  
Even though the transcendental unity of apperception is considered "the highest point" (B 134) 
of transcendental philosophy, it is by no means declared "absolute".  This would involve reason 
in a dialectic statement, which is precisely the case of the first Paralogism.  In the transcendental 
Deduction, the transcendental subject can perform its functions while remaining in itself 
perfectly unknown, "a mere something in general" (A 355).  The criterion for every discourse on 
the transcendental subject and the transcendental object is the "possibility of experience".  The 
transcendental subject and object are referred to only in their relation to it.  They represent the 
ultimate conditions of the possibility of experience: the former being the ultimate condition of 
the formal conditions and the latter the ultimate background of the material conditions of 
experience.  It is only in this sense that the interrogation of the thing in itself is rendered 
necessary.  If we read the end of an argument partly quoted above, the philosophical character of 
this necessity appears clearly. 
 
  In all problems which may arise in the field of experience we treat these appearances as 
objects in themselves, without troubling ourselves about the primary ground of their 
possibility (as appearances).  But to advance beyond these limits the concept of a 
transcendental object would be indispensably required. (A 393) 
 
 To be sure, the main problem posed by the first branch of Vaihinger's trilemma has not 
																																																																				
22 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 206/B 251-252, emphasis added.  Therefore, I cannot agree with Nicholas 
Rescher when he associates the problem of the thing in itself, as the correlate of the appearances, with the 
search for the unconditioned: "But correlative with the conception of the conditioned object of perception 
goes that of an unconditioned noumenon.  This conception is warranted and justified because it answers 
to the inexorable demands of a Principle of Sufficient Reason ('the unconditioned, which reason, by 
necessity and by right, demands... [something] to complete the series of conditions.')" "Noumenal 
Causality," 176. 
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yet been solved.  Even though we have seen that it is not required to prove that the status of the 
thing in itself is unconditioned (as in the ideas of the Dialectic), there is nevertheless a 
transcendental use of the category of cause that is made here, thus the question remains open as 
to whether or not Kant thereby contradicts the explicit lessons of the Analytic concerning the 
legitimate sphere of application of the categories.   
 Within the developments of transcendental philosophy, which aim primarily at 
circumscribing the domain of legitimate knowledge, it must be possible to extrapolate, if not 
discover, some of the guidelines for this higher level discourse.  This pertains not to critical 
philosophy as such, but to what Lewis White Beck calls a "meta-critique of pure reason".  I 
would like to retain the programmatic remarks made by Beck in order to see if they can be of 
some help in solving the problem we are now facing. 
 
  [Kant] has no explicit theory of how we come to know of the operations and faculties or 
abilities of the mind.  A detailed articulation of his informal procedure, however, would 
constitute a meta-critique of pure reason, but an internal one, continuous with the critical 
philosophy itself. I believe it would take the form I have sketchily outlined and would not 
be in conflict with any of the positive teachings of the Critique of Pure Reason.  Most 
particularly it would not require us to have knowledge which the Critique teaches we 
cannot have.23 
 
After having noticed that Kant had not paid sufficient attention to the methodological problems 
of transcendental philosophy, Beck goes on to claim not only that there must be no conflict 
between this methodology and the "positive teachings" of the Critique, but also that there must 
be a continuity between the transcendental principles and the discourse that formulates them.  
These remarks are compatible with a line of thought that I have already begun to develop 
elsewhere, and that can be labelled, following Rüdiger Bubner, the "self-referentiality" of Kant's 
transcendental philosophy.24  This form of self-reflexivity simply means that transcendental 
investigation, as a higher level discourse, cannot be ruled by its object-discourse  -- viz. 
experience as a field where it would find empirical confirmation -- but in some way by itself.  In 
																																																																				
23 Lewis White Beck, "Towards a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason," in the Proceedings of the Ottawa 
Congress on Kant in the Anglo-American and Continental Traditions, ed. Pierre Laberge, François 
Duchesneau & Bryan Morrisey (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1976), 192-193, Beck's emphasis. 
24 See my "Self-Referentiality in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy," in the Proceedings of the Eighth 
International Kant Congress, vol. 2, part 1, 259-267; and Rüdiger Bubner, "Was heisst Synthesis?," 
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992), 110.  [ Note of 2019: see 
also my contribution “Kant on the ‘Conditions of the Possibility’ of Experience”, in: S. Hoeltzel and H. 
Kim (eds), Transcendental Inquiry. Its History, Methods and Critiques, Cham (Zwitzerland), Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016, p. 1-19.  The ‘preprint’ version of this article can be found here on Papyrus. ] 
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other words, it must be governed by the very transcendental principles that it discovers in the 
course of the critical investigation:  there are no other guidelines available.  In the present case, it 
might be useful to ask if the principle of causality is also binding -- in some sense that remains to 
be clarified -- for the exposition of the problem of the thing in itself and, if this is the case, how it 
fulfils this task. 
 
5 - The special case of the dynamical categories 
 
 It must be noted that the category of causality (as well as the category of existence, that I 
will leave aside here), which Aenesidemus-Schulze accuses Kant of employing illegitimately, is 
of a specific kind.  It belongs to what Kant calls the dynamical, as opposed to the mathematical, 
categories.  He establishes this distinction repeatedly in the Analytic because it marks an 
important division in the table of the transcendental principles.  As we know, the first two 
principles are considered "mathematical", while the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates 
of Empirical Thought in general are dynamical principles.  These latter do not deal with the 
possible measurement of the appearances but rather with their existence, which cannot be known 
in anticipation.  The object must first be given empirically in order to be acknowledged as real, 
thus the dynamical principles regulate a priori the existence of appearances that must first be 
given through perception, that is, a posteriori. 
 
  It stands quite otherwise with those principles [i.e. dynamical, C.P.] which seek to bring 
the existence of appearances under rules a priori.  For since existence cannot be 
constructed, the principles can apply only to the relations of existence... If , however, a 
perception is given in a time-relation to some other perception, then even although this 
latter is indeterminate, and we consequently cannot decide a priori what it is, or what its 
magnitude may be, we may none the less assert that in its existence it is necessarily 
connected with the former in this mode of time.25 
 
Attention must be drawn to the fact that the correlate of the "given" perception is 
"indeterminate".  This is an important feature of the dynamical categories of relation and will 
prove relevant to the problem of the affecting object.  Kant stresses that it is impossible to 
determine a priori "what" this correlate might be.  This becomes especially obvious in the 
exposition of the principle of causality, in which the givenness of the effect entails that it stands 
"in relation to some preceding point in time" and that it refers to "something else in general 
																																																																				
25 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 179/B 221-2, Kant's emphasis.  The second occurrence of the expression 
a priori has been omitted in the translation of Kemp Smith, 210-211. 
	 16	
[etwas anderes überhaupt]".26 
 A second point worthy of note in the characterisation of the dynamical categories is the 
"heterogeneity" of the terms involved.  As compared to the mathematical principles, in which the 
pure and homogeneous intuition of space and time is the object of the synthesis, the connection 
between the correlates of the principle of causality is a synthesis of "heterogeneous" elements (B 
201).  This feature concerning the status of cause and effect has been amply stressed by Hume,27 
and it deserves no particular attention as long as the principle of causality is employed within the 
field of experience, where heterogeneity is understood, to paraphrase the Prolegomena, like the 
difference in nature between the sun, that emits rays of light, and the stone, on which a certain 
degree of warmth is felt. 
 However, these two features become engaging as soon as we leave the Analytic and enter 
the Transcendental Dialectic.  The inability for the dynamical categories to construct a priori the 
existence of their object proves, indeed, to be an advantage.  Since the categories of relation are 
not restricted to homogeneous parts (as is the case for the mathematical categories), their 
transcendental use in the third and fourth Antinomy allows for a positive solution to these 
dialectical conflicts of reason while the mathematical Antinomies end up being plainly 
contradictory.28 Hence in the mathematical connection of the series of appearances no other than 
a sensible condition is admissible, that is to say, in the dynamical series of sensible conditions, a 
heterogeneous condition, not itself a part of the series, but purely intelligible, and as such outside 
the series, can be allowed.  In this way reason obtains satisfaction and the unconditioned is set 
prior to the appearances, while the invariably conditioned character of the appearances is not 
obscured, nor their series cut short, in violation of the principles prescribed by the 
understanding."  My point is the following: if one wants to learn more about the transcendental 
use of the category of causality with respect to the thing in itself, one would be well advised to 
consult the transcendental use of this category specific to the third Antinomy, in which the 
problem of intelligible causality is extensively treated.  In other words, I propose to draw a 
																																																																				
26 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 194/B 239, Kant's emphasis.  See ibid., A 368: "Now the inference from a 
given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain, since the effect may be due to more than one 
cause."(emphasis mine)  See also Kritik der Urteilskraft, §88, AK. V, 457. 
27 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. IV, Part I, in Enquiries, ed. L. A. 
Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1902), 29. 
28 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 530-531/B 558-559: "But the concept of the understanding, which 
underlies these ideas, may contain either a synthesis solely of the homogeneous (which is presupposed 
alike in the composition and the division of every magnitude), or a synthesis of the heterogeneous. For 
the heterogeneous can be admitted as at least possible in the case of dynamical synthesis, alike in causal 
connection and in the connection of the necessary with the contingent. 
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parallel between the problem of the thing in itself as it arises in the Aesthetic and the question of 
transcendental freedom as a form of causality in the Dialectic.  One must, of course, remain 
conscious of the danger, to which I have already warned, of understanding this bringing together 
of the two questions as more than a parallel.  These two transcendental usages of causality are in 
fact different, but the critical exposition and solution of the third Antinomy furnishes 
indispensable conceptual tools with which the causality of the thing in itself can be understood 
from a transcendental vantage point.  We just have to keep in mind that the latter problem is not 
identical to the question raised in the third Antinomy, which pertains to freedom as the "sensibly 
unconditioned condition of appearances" (A 557/B 585, italics added).  As we have already seen, 
the thing in itself as the cause of appearances is not related to its being conditioned, nor 
unconditioned.  This aspect remains totally indeterminate. 
 The critical solution of the third Antinomy is interesting in that it admits two lines of 
explanation for "one and the same effect [eben derselben Wirkung]" (A 536/B 564).  This is 
reminiscent of the two -- apparently competing -- explanations of sensation expounded in the 
schema of reality and in the Anticipations of Perception.  The problem with a spontaneous cause, 
as it is described in the third Antinomy, lies in the fact that from the perspective of 
transcendental realism, there is no way of reconciling the free cause with the determinism ruling 
the empirical experience.  In fact, transcendental realism is the standpoint of common sense, 
insofar as the empirical object is regarded as the real thing -- the thing in itself -- together with its 
spatial and temporal features.  Only transcendental idealism, Kant argues, provides a solution to 
the problematic of freedom, in that it enjoins us to consider the empirical object not as a thing in 
itself, but as an appearance.  The perspective adopted in order to produce this solution is none 
other than that of the transcendental philosopher, that is, the point of view from which one is 
compelled to admit that there must be something beyond the mere appearances which serves as 
their grounds. If we leave aside the fact that the following passage seeks to solve the question of 
the possibility of a "spontaneous" cause, the way in which the critical solution is presented might 
just as well apply to our problem of the affecting object. 
 
  If… appearances are not taken for more than they actually are; if they are viewed not as 
things in themselves, but merely as representations, connected according to empirical 
laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances.  The effects of such 
an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other 
appearances, but its causality is not so determined.  While the effects are to be found in 
the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is 
outside the series.  Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible 
cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to 
the necessity of nature. (A 536-7/B 564-5) 
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If we remember that the problem of the affecting object and of sensation gives way to two lines 
of explanation in the Analytic, the solution proposed above, and taken from the Dialectic, could 
be read as the answer Kant would have given, had he endeavoured to furnish an explicit account, 
within his transcendental philosophy, of the thing in itself as the "cause" of appearances.  After 
all, it is "one and the same event", "one and the same effect" that receives a double explanation 
in the case of the third Antinomy; in the same manner as sensation, the result of affection, 
received two different causal accounts in the Analytic: an empirical, and a transcendental.  
Hence, there is no need to postulate as in Adickes’ questionable theory of "double affection", that 
there are two different affections taking place. 
 As mentioned before, such a parallel can only be drawn cautiously, because freedom and 
the thing in itself refer to different problems.  The conclusion of the transcendental Dialectic 
concerning the status of freedom as well as all transcendental ideas is that we cannot attain any 
knowledge of them: they remain wholly "problematic".  But this conclusion is directed mainly 
against the pretensions of dogmatic metaphysicians, who did not hesitate to pronounce upon the 
existence or inexistence of a free cause in the world.  For Kant, the functioning of a free cause is 
problematic, in the same way as an immortal soul and a necessary being endowed with all 
reality, remain an insoluble problem from a theoretical standpoint.  In the three dialectic ideas of 
reason, a dogmatic statement is made about the inner nature of a transcendent object: for 
example, the simplicity of the soul, the reality of freedom and the necessity of a being defined as 
omnitudo realitatis.  In this regard, the problem of the affecting object is radically different, 
although it must be dealt with on the same level of discourse: transcendental philosophy.   
 In explaining affection, and sensation  -- its effect -- in terms of the thing in itself, Kant 
does not intend to establish any knowledge about the type of causality at work nor does he try to 
determine the correlate of appearance, beyond saying that it is "heterogeneous"29 and 
indeterminate, that is, a "mere something" (A 277/B 333) which is definitively out of reach of 
our knowledge.  Following the principle of causality in its empirical employment which states 
that "everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows 
according to a rule" (A 189), Kant refuses, using the category of causality for the thing in itself, 
to specify the "rule" or the kind of causal action involved and to determine the essence of the 
acting cause.  Thus, when he employs the category of causality for the thing in itself in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, it is clear that he does not exceed in any way the very modest claims 
attached to a transcendental usage.  "The merely transcendental employment of the categories is, 
therefore, really no employment at all ['for the knowing of anything': Nachträge, CXXVII] and 
has no determinate object, not even one that is determinable in its mere form." (A 247-8/B 304, 
																																																																				
29 Prolegomena, § 57, AK, IV, 355. 
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emphasis added) 
 Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that because the thing in itself, as the correlate of 
the appearances, remains indeterminate, its existence itself is problematic.  The critical 
philosopher knows that there is something beyond the appearance but he/she does not know what 
it is.  Already in the Aesthetic, it is only the nature of the thing in itself that is said to be 
"problematic", not its actuality (A 38/B 54).  Nonetheless, there is a strong temptation to declare 
that the very existence of the thing in itself, together with its nature, is on the whole problematic.  
One is led to this conclusion when one identifies the thing in itself with the Noumenon, whose 
status as such is manifestly problematic.  But it must be stressed that Kant envisages the status of 
the Noumenon as problematic only if it is taken in its "positive" meaning.  According to this 
meaning, the Noumenon is considered the object of an intellectual intuition, the constitution of 
which remains totally unknown to the human being.  Hence, the Noumenon is problematic as an 
object of intellectual intuition precisely because this mode of intuiting is altogether problematic.  
"...we have no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which 
objects outside the field of sensibility can be given..." (A 255/B 310)  But this has little to do 
with the critical claim that we have knowledge of the existence of a mere something beyond the 
appearances: the thing in itself.  
 Another danger encountered in considering the thing in itself as a mere "logical 
possibility"30 is that one can be led to consider it on the same level as the ideas of pure reason.  
In accordance with Kant's critical solution of the dialectic use of pure reason, one might then 
come to confer on the thing in itself a regulative role, similar to that attributed to the 
transcendental ideas.  For example, Eva Schaper classifies the thing in itself under the heading 
"heuristic fictions", which is indeed the title reserved by Kant for the problematic ideas of reason 
in their regulative use.31  Rescher makes a similar point when he interprets the thing in itself in 
relation to the Principle of Sufficient Reason as a regulative principle (as opposed to the 
principle of causality belonging to the understanding proper) suited to characterize the 
transcendental tasks that correspond to the ideas of reason.32   
																																																																				
30 Ermanno Bencivenga, "Identity, Appearances, and Things in Themselves," Dialogue 23 (1984): 430, 
notes 18 and 19. 
31 Eva Schaper, "The Kantian Thing in Itself as a Philosophical Fiction," The Philosophical Quarterly 16 
(1966): 238: "Kant himself did not include the thing-in-itself among his ideas of reason, the only group of 
concepts which, in the first Critique, he admitted as heuristic fictions.  My case for including it 
nevertheless is based -- as was Vaihinger's -- on the similarity in logical behaviour of this concept and 
those which Kant himself designated as leading to 'merely regulative principles'." 
32 Rescher, "Noumenal Causality," 178. 
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 I on the other hand tend to envisage the thing in itself, so long as it is said to be the cause 
of the appearances, as constitutive, and not regulative, with respect to the possibility of 
experience.  If the ideas of reason, in their regulative role, are assigned to the search for the 
unconditioned, that is, for the complete series of the conditions of experience, then the thing in 
itself does not have anything to do with these transcendent tasks of pure reason but belongs to 
the framework of the conditions of possibility of every single experience.  It is at least as 
"constitutive" of the experience as the transcendental subject itself.  Therefore, the thing in itself 
pertains to arguments in the first half of the Critique (if not exclusively to a question raised in the 
Aesthetic) but certainly not in the Dialectic.  The knowing subject discovers through the 
philosophical process of self-examination that, if a priori synthetic judgments are to be possible 
at all, that is, if there are to be universal and necessary truths, the objects of knowledge must be 
appearances.  Yet empirical objects, although they are mere appearances, are nonetheless given 
to us.  This means that if an appearance occurs whose manifold is not generated by the knowing 
subject itself, then an external cause must exist, although it be unknowable.  In other words, the 
thing in itself is not regulative but constitutive of the very possibility of experience, and 
therefore, from a transcendental vantage point, its existence is not merely problematic, but 
assertoric.  Kant's numerous statements against the charge of idealism state as much.33 
 
 In the preceding sections, I have tried to show that Jacobi's famous phrase according to 
which one cannot enter the Kantian system without the affecting object, but cannot stay in it on 
the basis of this very presupposition, is false.  On the contrary, Kant is perfectly at ease with his 
theory of affection even though it allows two different modes of explanation.  I have sought to 
indicate in what sense these -- apparently conflicting -- modes of explanation can be part of a 
coherent account of the conditions of human knowledge, more precisely, in what sense they are 
both required.  All in all, Kant cannot be accused of negligence when he uses the pure concept of 
cause to depict the effect of the thing in itself on sensibility.  This transcendental use of the 
																																																																				
33 See for example Prolegomena, AK IV, 289; trans. L. W. Beck, Prolegomena to any Future 
Metaphysics, New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1951, 36-37: "Consequently I grant by all means that 
there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in 
themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us.  
These representations we call 'bodies', a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is 
unknown to us, but not therefore less actual.  Can this be termed idealism?  It is the very contrary...The 
existence of the thing that appear is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown 
that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself."  See also, ibid., AK IV, 293-294; and 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XX: "This situation yields, however, just the very experiment by which, 
indirectly, we are enabled to prove the truth of this first estimate of our a priori knowledge of reason, 
namely, that such knowledge has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing in itself as indeed 
real [wirklich] per se, but as not known to us." 
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category is, as we have seen, permissible.  At least, I have tried to make sense of it through a 
reconstruction of the argument Kant would have provided, had he deemed to justify this truly 
exceptional use of the categories from the standpoint of his transcendental philosophy.   
 Now Kant did not explicitly provide this justification.  Thus the concept of cause applied 
to the thing in itself appears out of place, especially with regard to the prohibitions of the 
Critique concerning the transcendental employment of the categories.  In this sense, Kant can be 
suspected of negligence.  Yet the absence of such a justification can be explained, as far as I can 
see, by two reasons: first, the thing in itself considered as the correlate of the appearance is 
related to the material conditions of experience, whereas only the formal conditions seem to 
come into the foreground in the Critique; secondly, in the Methodology of Pure Reason, Kant's 
remarks on the meta-critique of pure reason or, if we prefer, on the workings of his philosophical 
discourse are rather scarce and call for a reconstruction as the one briefly sketched here with the 
theme of self-referentiality. 
 The contribution of this paper is that I tried to make sense of the thing in itself, as the 
"transcendental ground" of appearances.  Rather than simply consider the thing in itself as a 
"necessary" concept, as in Allison's view, my purpose was to demonstrate that for Kant the 
actuality of the thing in itself as the cause of appearances must be necessarily posited.  The thing 
in itself is not just an epistemic condition that we must "think", it is a critical-metaphysical 
assumption that must be made and thus becomes part of philosophical knowledge: the critical 
philosopher knows that there is something beyond the appearances.  But in this case, there is 
nothing dogmatic about such an assumption, since it is required by the transcendental 
explanation of our knowledge itself.  I have tried to argue that there is a legitimate philosophical 
use of the category of causality which links affection to the thing in itself, as long as the 
constraints implied by such a concept (i.e. heterogeneity and indeterminateness of the correlate) 
are respected, even at this higher level of argumentation.  The normative constraints of such a 
transcendental discourse cannot be empirical, nor can they be the product of a pure invention.  
The self-referentiality of philosophy, as it has been sketched here, entails that the transcendental 
use of a category is permissible strictly in view of the explanation of the only way in which 
experience is rendered possible.   
 
